Central bank independence in the MENA region using the Jacome 2001 index: The case of Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia

Résumé

This article examines central banks independence in the MENA region employing the Jacome (2001) legal index, drawing upon the most recent law of the central banks of Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The findings reveal a substantial strengthening of independence among these central banks following statutory reforms, although notable differences persist regarding their levels of independence. The Moroccan central bank appears to be the most independent in the region, particularly with respect to autonomy from the political regime and procedures surrounding the appointment of governors and council members, criteria that are decisive in determining the degree of central bank independence.

These differences have important implications for monetary credibility and policy effectiveness. Strengthening central bank autonomy can support more transparent and stable governance, contributing to broader economic development objectives. This study also provides an empirical and comparative perspective on central bank independence in the MENA region, offering useful guidance for policymakers and contributing to the underrepresented literature on institutional reforms in developing economies.